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Abstract The adoption by WHO’s member states of the International Health 
Regulations (2005) represents a paradigm shift away from mandatory 
reporting	of	specific	diseases	to	a	requirement	for	ministries	of	health	
to notify WHO concerning any potential Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern (PHEIC). 
The European Union (EU) has also issued legislation on CDS&C, 
epidemic early warning and response, bioterrorism, and large 
number	 of	 related	 fields,	 including	 food	 safety,	 water	 quality,	
zoonotic diseases, blood safety, border controls, data protection 
and	 confidentiality	 etc,	 that	 are	 binding	 on	 EU	 member	 states.	
Harmonisation of national public health legislation to this acquis 
communautaire is a requirement for accession to the EU.
This paper reviews the key guidance on strengthening CDS&C 
systems to meet the IHR and EU requirements, and it attempts to 
give a brief overview of international resources and implementation 
activities. If WHO member states are to respect the deadline of 
2012 for achieving the stated IHR minimum core capacities, 
significant	domestic	investment	will	also	be	required,	particularly	for	
laboratory strengthening. Furthermore, Field Epidemiology Training 
Programmes and laboratory scientist training schemes will need to be 
established within the context of attractive careers in public health. 
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Teaching methods Review paper of current state of the art.
Specific recommendations
for teachers
100% individual students’ work. 
Assessment of 
students
Could be assessed by the quality of proposals and plans for 
strengthening CDS&C that result. 
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EPIDEMIOLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL OF 
COMMUNICABLE DISEASE: BASIS FOR EVIDENCE BASED 
HEALTH PROMOTION AND EARLY RESPONSE - PRACTICAL 
PERSPECTIVE
Rob Stevens
Introduction
Surveillance provides health intelligence to health protection systems, which are the 
foundation for health promotion. The need for health intelligence has never been greater: 
good communicable disease surveillance and control (CDS&C) has already limited the spread 
of	avian	influenza,	it	helps	to	prevent	a	pandemic	of	human	influenza,	and	even	if	that	is	not	
possible,	 it	may	provide	sufficient	early	warning	to	slow	down	global	spread,	giving	time	
to implement measures that could save millions of lives1; and good public health practice 
appears to have eliminated the new disease of SARS2. Strengthening of surveillance systems 
is necessary, however, to sustain successes and, for instance, to detect deliberate release of 
biological agents against the background ‘noise’ of endemic disease3, and to institute second 
generation surveillance for HIV/AIDS. 
The adoption by WHO’s member states of the International Health Regulations (IHR) 
2005 represents a paradigm shift away from mandatory reporting of three named diseases to 
a requirement for ministries of health to consult WHO concerning any health-related event 
that may pose serious international risk. 
The European Union (EU) has also issued legislation on CDS&C, bioterrorism, and 
large	 number	 of	 related	 fields,	 including	 food	 and	 water	 quality,	 zoonotic	 diseases	 and	
blood safety, that are binding on EU member states. Harmonisation of national public health 
legislation to this acquis communautaire is a requirement for accession to the EU. Accession 
programmes in South-Eastern Europe have had a considerable impact of surveillance system 
strengthening.
This chapter reviews the key guidance on strengthening CDS&C systems to meet the IHR 
and EU requirements, and it attempts to give a brief overview of international resources and 
implementation activities. The promotion of health can be understood in at least two senses: 
1) advocating for conditions and values in society that tend to improve population health; or 
2) improving the health and wellbeing of individuals by encouraging them to have positive 
attitudes and behaviours. Strengthening surveillance contributes to both understandings by, 
in	the	first	case,	providing	evidence	of	the	need	to	maintain	and	improve	traditional	public	
health interventions such as sanitation, clean water and vaccination; and in second, yielding 
persuasive information on risk, and the effectiveness of both protective factors themselves 
and their communication to the public.  
Concepts and Definitions
CDS&C is a cornerstone of public health, which is:
‘The science and art of preventing disease, prolonging life and promoting health through 
the organised efforts and informed choices of society, organisations, public and private, 
communities and individuals.’ 4
This	definition	comes	from	a	Ministry	of	Finance	report	that	puts	forward	evidence-based	
arguments for substantial increases in multi-sectoral spending on health as a cost-effective 
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means of improving both individual prosperity and national productivity. This represents 
one of the few occasions since the post World War-II expansion of welfare systems in both 
communist and capitalism countries that investments in health have been recommended as 
good economics. Such arguments are particularly relevant right across WHO’s European 
Region, where there is a strong and direct relationship between gross domestic product 
(GDP) and the percentage of GDP spent on health. On average, in countries which have a 
smaller ‘cake’, the health sector also gets a smaller cut of this cake. This relationship can be 
easily	verified	by	plotting	national	wealth	against	health	expenditure	indicators	oneself	from	
the WHO European Health For All database5. 
Surveillance creates health information that contributes to national and international 
databases5,6,7,8, which are important sources for advocating for increased health resources 
at national level. But it can be differentiated from other types of regular statistical reporting 
by the fact that it is set up for the main purpose of vigilance for alert conditions, such as 
outbreaks of communicable disease, or unexpected changes in the occurrence rates of 
chronic diseases. Vigilance for the unexpected often requires interpretation and judgement 
– epidemic intelligence9 – which is conceptually distinct from simple monitoring of expected 
results within a statistical normal range. Surveillance is itself an ‘open’ system, i.e. open to 
alert	signals	coming	from	the	wider	environment	which	do	not	have	to	be	completely	defined	
a priori. However, most systems contain ‘closed’ systems of monitoring health-related event 
reports	against	a	statistically	defined	threshold.	The	clinical	specialty	of	anaesthetics	provides	
a	good	analogy.	The	anaesthetist	monitors	the	patient’s	blood	gas	levels	and	regulates	artificial	
ventilation in order to keep them within the normal range; whereas he or she is vigilant for 
electrocardiographic signs of arrhythmia, making an emergency response if necessary. 
Public	Health	Surveillance	(PHS)	can	be	defined	as:	
‘The ongoing, systematic collection, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of 
data about a health-related event for use in public health action to reduce morbidity 
and mortality and to improve health’ 10 
Its main functions include supporting case detection and public health interventions, 
estimating the impact of a disease or injury, portraying the natural history of a health condition, 
determining the distribution and spread of illness, generating hypotheses and stimulating 
research, evaluating prevention and control measures, facilitating planning and detecting 
outbreaks of communicable diseases. The characteristic that PHS is ‘ongoing’, often over a 
period of many years, means that it is particularly suited to tracking trends and advocating 
increase and/or reallocation of resources for public health. It is clearly differentiated from 
one-off	pieces	of	research,	which	must	be	justified	according	to	the	precise	state	of	knowledge	
applying at the time of proposal. 
The characteristic that PHS relates to data ‘about a health-related event’ means that 
surveillance	 entails	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 sources	 of	 information,	 not	 just	 official	 notification	
of disease occurrence. Sources include various levels within the ‘clinical iceberg’ from 
asymptomatic infection or pre-morbid pathology through presentation to clinical services, 
diagnostic	confirmation	and	treatment,	to	death;	the	prevalence	of	risk	and	protective	factors;	
the effectiveness of modifying conditions such as susceptibility to pharmaceutical treatment, 
efficacy	of	vaccination	and	impact	of	health	promoting	policy;	and	signals	that	are	of	use	in	
early warning such as symptoms, syndromes, drug sales, rumours and media reports (the latter 
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being the subject of the WHO GPHIN11). The broad scope of surveillance gives opportunities 
for triangulation of data sources, and interpretation should be carried out by specialists with 
a broad awareness of general public health practice.  
The characteristic that it is ‘for use in public health action’ designates its purpose as 
response – either acute (epidemic-type) or planned (management-type) – and this has led 
some countries to institutionalise PHS of biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear 
threats within a named ‘health protection’ system12. Viewing surveillance as part of a national 
health protection system implies that surveillance should 1) yield information relevant 
to the national capacity for public health action, such as food safety inspectorates, water 
quality assurance, vaccination coverage and disease control programmes, and 2) its impact 
should be assessed not only at the level of outcome (attributable reductions in morbidity and 
mortality); but also process, in terms of its successful advocacy for improvements in capacity 
for action. The impact of surveillance information on food borne diseases could, for instance, 
be evaluated in terms of numbers of successful applications of food safety legislation.  
The characteristic that PHS is ‘systematic’ refers to the fact that information is produced 
by planned, orderly, systems which are ‘human organisations of interacting components, 
which are carriers of numerous complex operating procedures and organisational structures13. 
A surveillance system may therefore be thought of as a dedicated human and technological 
resource set up primarily for gathering intelligence for health protection, disease prevention 
and bio-security. This intelligence contributes to the broader enabling process of changing or 
coping	with	the	environment,	which	is	defined	as	health	promotion	in	the	Ottawa	Charter14: 
‘Health promotion is the process of enabling people to increase control over, and to 
improve, their health. To reach a state of complete physical, mental and social well-
being, an individual or group must be able to identify and to realize aspirations, to 
satisfy needs, and to change or cope with the environment. Health is, therefore, seen 
as a resource for everyday life, not the objective of living. Health is a positive concept 
emphasizing social and personal resources, as well as physical capacities. Therefore, 
health promotion is not just the responsibility of the health sector, but goes beyond 
healthy life-styles to well-being.’
PHS enables people themselves to take better control of their health by providing accurate 
risk information and health education messages; and it enables policy makers to advocate for 
resources and allocate them optimally for preventing disease, prolonging life and promoting 
positive health. 
As well as having a broad range of sources of data, an optimal system for a particular 
health-related event tends to contain a mix of surveillance types. These types include, in order 
of increasing specialisation: syndromic surveillance; active data collection (contrasted with 
passive	notification);	enhanced	surveillance;	sentinel	networks;	planned,	repeated,	standard	
surveys of risk groups, e.g. behavioural surveillance of groups at high risk of HIV. Syndromic 
surveillance	refers	to	the	reporting	of	cases	which	meet	a	definition	based	solely	on	clinical	
symptoms	and	signs,	not	laboratory	confirmation.	The	advantages	of	syndromic	surveillance	
(e.g. for sexually transmitted diseases)15 include: gaining information where laboratory 
confirmation	is	not	available	or	affordable;	improving	sensitivity	at	the	expense	specificity	
in order to estimate overall burden of illness; and widening the population base for early 
warning. It also has clear application in detecting unusual health-related events which may be 
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of unkown cause, such as may occur in bioterrorist attacks. In active surveillance, the registry 
actively contacts practitioners, requesting them to provide information in a standard form 
on	any	cases	which	meet	a	case	definition.	Surveillance	of	the	congenital	rubella	syndrome	
by paediatric professional societies16  is a good example of this. Enhanced surveillance 
refers	to	combining	extra	information	with	the	data	required	by	statutory	notification,	such	
as case based information on risk-group membership, route of infection, markers of recent 
infection etc., or organism related information such as anti-microbial susceptibility. Sentinel 
surveillance refers to the designation of a sub-population for surveillance in which evidence 
of infection can provide early warning of a threat to wider populations. Examples include 
the use of ‘sentinel chickens’ for sero-surveillance of some vector borne viral diseases17, 
and primary health care networks for early warning and intensity prediction of seasonal 
influenza	epidemics18. The use of the word ‘sentinel’ is a military metaphor, a sentinel is a 
look-out who watches for approaching enemies in order to alert defence to the urgent need 
for action. The best known example of planned, repeated, standard surveys of risk groups is 
second generation surveillance of HIV/AIDS19,20,21.	Repeated	standard	surveys	are	difficult	to	
institutionalise because they require dedicated resources and project management capacity, 
competing with other priorities in ministries’ annual plans. In order to be approved as 
projects, they are usually required to have statistical power similar to that of epidemiological 
research.    
 The essential feature of any system for detecting outbreaks of CD is the ability to 
determine epidemiological linkage. The daily or weekly occurrence of sporadic cases may 
fluctuate	 and	 unless	 they	 can	 be	 linked	 in	 person,	 place	 and	 time,	 outbreak	 investigation	
is unlikely to be fruitful. The majority of outbreaks come to light because an unusually 
large number of cases present to clinical services over a short time, raising suspicion. It 
is important therefore to scan local media for reports of outbreaks that may not have been 
notified	to	the	proper	authorities.	Where	a	disease	is	more	widespread	in	the	population,	or	
an outbreak develops over a long time-scale, epidemiological linkage can usually only be 
detected through case-based electronic registers.
 Figure 1 presents WHO’s conceptual framework for communicable diseases 
surveillance,	which	was	first	described	in	200222 and continues to be elaborated through a 
series of guidance documents23,24,25  issued	by	WHO/CSR	office	 in	Lyon26 (for a summary 
of	the	activities	of	this	office	see	reference	aa).	It	contains	four	domains,	describing	a	set	of	
29	topics	in	total,	each	of	which	can	be	represented	by	one	or	more	indicators	defined	at	the	
national level24.	The	domains	define	the	organisation	and	performance	of	a	system	for	the	
surveillance of a particular health-related event in terms of its structure, core and support 
functions, and its quality10.  
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Figure 1. Components of surveillance and response systems for monitoring and evaluation
CD Surveillance and Control Policy Development in Europe
The	financial	 crisis	 in	European	welfare	 systems,	 especially	 in	 the	 former	 communist	
countries, has slowed progress toward targets and reduced the resources available to public 
health28.The need for a ‘new paradigm’ for PHS was clearly stated by WHO in the year 
2000: 
‘some surveillance systems have lost momentum, are poorly maintained or have 
virtually collapsed…Outdated surveillance systems, in which new surveillance 
targets have been added but old ones never removed, often lead to central bodies 
collecting huge amounts of data with little or no analysis and use of the corresponding 
information. Feedback to the data collectors is rarely provided. The surveillance 
system becomes driven by the need to collect and move data while scant attention is 
given to using the data at each level of the health service for decision-making.’29
An essential understanding of surveillance can be promoted through the slogan 
‘Information for Action’. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate that public health decision making for 
communicable disease control should result in two types of response22: 
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Figures 2 and 3: Public health response:
Fig 2. Acute (epidemic-type)           Fig 3. Planned (management-type)
Acute responses are analogous to secondary prevention, reducing the overall population 
impact; whereas planned responses may be aimed at primary prevention of spread and eventual 
disease elimination. WHO’s 2000 paper goes on to describe a surveillance policy solution 
to the problems of obsolescence, duplication, fragmentation and disconnection from public 
health action in terms of a strengthened, streamlined system of ‘integrated communicable 
disease	surveillance’,	defined	as:	
‘the sum of all surveillance activities which add up to the national surveillance 
system. The various surveillance activities become integrated into one system within 
the broader national health information system.’29  
It is further described as exploiting opportunities for synergy between existing surveillance 
systems	in	order	to	carrying	out	the	core	and	support	functions	defined	in	Figure	1;	seeking	
to maintain surveillance and control functions close to one another organisationally and 
geographically; and being best approached by developing and strengthening surveillance 
networks. 
In Europe, there are two main drivers of surveillance policy: the International Health 
Regulations (IHR)30,31,32 and the body of EC legislation relating to CD surveillance, early 
warning and response33.	The	IHR	specifically	request	member	states	to	develop	and	implement	
national plans of action following an initial assessment of the existing national structures and 
the resources to implement minimal core capacities for surveillance and response: 
Detection at community / primary health level:
(a) to detect events involving disease or death above expected levels for the particular time 
and place in all areas within the territory;
(b) to report all available essential information immediately; and 
(c) to implement preliminary control measures immediately.
Detection at intermediate public health levels:
(a)	to	confirm	the	status	of	reported	events	and	to	support	or	implement	additional	control	
measures; and
(b) to assess reported events immediately and, if found urgent, to report all essential 
information to the national level. 
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Response at national level:
Assessment and notification. 
(a) to assess all reports of urgent events within 48 hours; and
(b)	to	notify	WHO	immediately	when	the	assessment	indicates	the	event	is	notifiable.	
Public health response. 
(a) to determine rapidly control measures to prevent spread;
(b) to provide support through specialized staff, laboratory analysis of samples and logistical 
assistance;
(c) to provide on-site assistance as required to supplement local investigations;
(d)	to	provide	a	direct	operational	link	with	senior	health	and	other	officials	to	approve	rapidly	
and implement containment and control measures;
(e) to provide direct liaison with other relevant government ministries;
(f)	to	provide,	by	the	most	efficient	means	of	communication	available	for	communication	of	
WHO	recommendations	to	the	field;
(g) to establish, operate and maintain a national public health emergency response plan, 
including the creation of multidisciplinary/multisectoral teams to respond to events that 
may constitute a PHEIC; and
(h) to provide the foregoing on a 24-hour basis.
 
The IHR were adopted by all 52 member states of WHO’s European Region in 2005 and 
will	enter	into	force	at	the	end	of	2007,	unless	member	states	specifically	opt	out.	A	three	phase	
approach to implementation has been suggested32, beginning in 2006, providing assistance in 
assessment 2007-2009, and continuing support and monitoring progress until 2012 The IHR 
no	longer	contain	prescriptive	requirements	for	international	notification	of	certain	diseases	
but are based on an algorithm requiring the member states to notify a potential Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) within 48 hours of its occurrence. A potential 
PHEIC	should	be	notified	when	1)	an	unusual	or	severe	health-related	event	has	occurred,	
which	2)	may	have	a	significant	public	health	impact,	which	3)	may	spread	across	borders	
and 4) may affect free the movement of goods or people. In order to meet these requirements, 
member	 states	 must	 have	 an	 efficient	 means	 of	 confirming	 or	 ruling	 out	 certain	 causes	
of health-related events in order to know whether they meet any of these four criteria. In 
particular, laboratory services must be adequate for this purpose. It is generally not feasible 
to maintain laboratories capable of meeting the demands of the IHR under quality assured, or 
preferably accredited, conditions unless they are integrated into routine health services and 
CD surveillance. In addition to arguments of economy of scale, maximum return on sunk 
capital	and	minimal	marginal	cost	per	test,	laboratories	must	maintain	proficiency	to	act	in	
an emergency through routine practice. The same it true for Port Health services. The WHO 
Regional	Office	for	Europe34 contains a department for Communicable Disease Surveillance 
and Response (CSR) with a staff of approximately 10 people and a regular (WHO) budget of 
$1.4m plus $1.0m from other sources in the biennium 2004-535. However, many other WHO 
departments contribute to CDS&C and the total number of technical staff in EURO was 310, 
with a total budget of $155m in 2004/5.
The body of EC legislation33 relating to CDS&C commenced with a framework decision 
of the European Parliament and Council (2119/98/EC) establishing Community networks for 
CDS&C: 
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‘As regards epidemiological surveillance, the network shall be established by 
bringing into permanent communication with one another, through all appropriate 
technical means, the Commission and those structures and/or authorities which, at 
the level of each Member State and under the responsibility of that Member State, 
are competent at national level and are charged with collecting information relating 
to the epidemiological surveillance of communicable diseases, and by establishing 
procedures for the dissemination of the relevant surveillance data at Community 
level.’ 
The framework has then been elaborated in an ongoing series of Decisions of the European 
Commission,	 beginning	 with	 96/2000/EC,	 which	 defines	 ESCON	 (the	 Epidemiological	
Surveillance Component of the Community Network), in terms of a list of diseases for 
progressive coverage by member states. The scope of this list is necessarily narrower than 
the IHR, which by implication also cover chemical, radiological and nuclear threats. The 
operative word ‘progressive’ means that the EC takes into account members states’ current 
conditions in assessing their progress to harmonization. EWRS (Early Warning and Response 
System36) was established (57/2000/EC) and has similar attributes to WHO GOARN8. It 
defines	three	phases	of	activation	according	to	public	health	risk	in	a	way	which	is	compatible	
with the IHR algorithm (a useful conceptual overview of early warning and response is 
available from US CDC37).	253/2002/EC	sets	case	definitions	for	the	list	of	notifiable	diseases	
which	was	subsequently	extended	and	updated	by	534/2003/EC.	These	case	definitions	are	
intended to ensure that the data from member state surveillance systems are ‘comparable and 
compatible’.	There	are	some	differences	from	the	case	definitions	recommended	by	WHO38. 
The	main	reason	for	this	is	that	the	EC	definitions	are	intended	to	achieve	comparability	and	
compatibility	of	national	surveillance	data	by	increasing	the	specificity	of	diagnoses	through	
laboratory	confirmation,	whereas	the	WHO	definitions	lean	more	toward	sensitivity,	in	order	
to	estimate	burden	of	disease.	The	EC	case	definitions	are	currently	under	review	by	ECDC	
jointly	with	the	WHO	Regional	Office	for	Europe.	Given	the	difference	in	aim,	however,	it	is	
not	clear	that	they	can	be	unified	into	a	single	system.	542/2003/EC	concerns	the	operation	
of	the	Community	networks.	At	the	time	of	writing	there	are	thirteen	named	disease	specific	
networks	plus	a	basic	surveillance	network	covering	all	notifiable	health	conditions	on	the	
listam. In parallel with the IHR’s requirement for member states to produce plans of action, 
this Decision requires members of the surveillance networks to address a list of topics by 
submitting Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to the Community network, stating: 
1. The coordinating structure and decision-making process.
2. Project management administration and supervision.
3.	 Case	definitions,	nature,	and	type	of	data	to	be	collected.
4.	 Data	management	and	protection,	including	data	access	and	confidentiality.
5. Ways in which data are made comparable and compatible (quality requirements and 
data validation).
6. Appropriate technical means and the procedures by which the data are to be 
disseminated and analysed at Community level (data dissemination and reporting).
7. Proposed public health action, infection control procedures, and laboratory 
procedures.
In particular, 542/2003/EC requires the creation of a national point of contact, which 
could be the same as the IHR ‘focal point’, and which is in permanent communication with 
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the	European	Commission	with	regard	to	EWRS.	A	report	of	actual	notifications	to	EWRS	
can be found in 394/2005/COM, and 605/2005/COM gives further guidance in preparing 
public health emergency plans, covering: information management ; communications ; 
scientific	advice	;	 liaison	and	command	and	control	structures;	preparedness	of	 the	health	
sector; and preparedness in all other sectors and inter-sectorally. The last major Decision 
to be published by the end of 2006 (the time of writing), 851/2004/EC, is the founding 
regulation establishing the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC39). It 
envisages the participation of third countries (who are not member states of the EU) ‘which 
have concluded agreements with the Community by virtue of which they have adopted and 
apply	legislation	of	equivalent	effect	to	Community	legislation	in	the	field	covered	by	this	
Regulation.’	In	2006,	ECDC	had	a	budget	of	€16	million	and	was	set	to	have	100	staff.	The	
Centre’s	budget	will	grow	to	over	€50	million	by	2010,	and	its	staff	to	300,	over	the	coming	
years. During the period of its development, the EU Health and Security Committee will 
continue its responsibilities in relation to IHR at least until 2008 (according to 699/2006/
EC), in coordination with the EC, member states and ECDC. The ECDC website contains 
the membership of its technical Advisory Forum and Managing Board, its work plan, draft 
framework for an EU surveillance strategy40, technical programmes and minutes of Managing 
Board meetings. ECDC is an agency of the European Commission which works in partnership 
with the national health protection institutes of member states in the areas of: surveillance; 
scientific	advice;	identification	of	emerging	health	threats	(“epidemic	intelligence”);	training;	
communications; providing technical assistance (“country support”). Its main activities are:
•	 Evaluating existing Community networks and reviewing the surveillance objectives 
for the diseases covered, including: 
(a) providing quality assurance by monitoring and evaluating surveillance activities 
to ensure optimal operation;
(b) maintaining the databases for such epidemiological surveillance;
(c) communicating the results of the analysis of data to the Community network; and
(d) harmonising and rationalising the operating methodologies.
•	 Determining	the	functional	specifications	of	the	IT	infrastructure.	
•	 Reviewing	and	updating	the	case	definitions	for	EU	surveillance.	
•	 Integrating laboratory support into surveillance; by:
(a) encouraging cooperation between expert and reference laboratories, the Centre 
shall	foster	the	development	of	sufficient	capacity	within	the	Community	for	
the	diagnosis,	detection,	identification	and	characterisation	of	infectious	agents	
which may threaten public health. 
•	 Prioritising surveillance needs in collaboration with stakeholders. 
In addition to these activities, ECDC is gradually taking over the functions of several 
ongoing surveillance related projects funded through the EC framework programmes for 
public health41,	which	together	with	disease	specific	and	basic	surveillance	networks	comprise	
what is know as the Community network. Eurosurveillance42 is a peer reviewed, on-line, 
weekly, monthly and quarterly journal that has archives going back to 1995. It contains 
outbreak alert notices and investigation reports as well as original articles on epidemiological 
topics and developments in surveillance methodology. The on-line archive is searchable and 
it	represents	the	most	important	single	body	of	professional	reflection	on	surveillance	practice	
within the EU, and presents many practical examples that are relevant to its neighbours. It is 
available in English and French since 1995, and more recently the quarterly version has been 
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available in several other Latin languages. Articles from Eurosurveillance are a good source 
of material for presentation in journal clubs and workshops, because they raise and discuss 
real world problems and inconsistencies in surveillance.  
EPIET43, the European Programme of Intervention Epidemiology Training, was launched 
in	1995,	based	on	the	lessons	learned	from	field	epidemiology	training	in	the	Epidemiological	
Intelligence Service of US CDC44.	 A	 cohort	 of	 ten	 to	 twenty	 field	 epidemiologists	 has	
graduated each year after spending two years as a fellow at one of the accredited training 
centres in a country other than their own. Most of the EPIET fellows who have been trained 
so far, approximately 120 in number, have taken up senior posts in European CDS&C, and 
they are members of the voluntary EPIET Alumni Network (EAN) which provides informal 
communication between these professionals who speak a common technical language. 
Younger candidates are selected at competitive interview to give a good representation across 
EU	member	states	from	individuals	who	intend	to	pursue	a	career	in	field	epidemiology,	and	
who have both prior experience and previous epidemiological training, such as a master’s 
degree in public health. The stated mission of EPIET is to:
•	 Develop a European network of intervention epidemiologists.
•	 Develop a response capacity inside and beyond the European Union.
•	 To strengthen communicable disease surveillance and control in the European 
Union.
EPIET has close links to the European Field Epidemiology Training Programmes 
(FETPs)	in	Spain,	Italy	and	Germany	that	were	designed	to	increase	national	capacity	in	field	
epidemiology. National FETP programmes tend to operate a similar two year fellowship to 
EPIET but based in their own countries. To be recognised as an FETP, a national training 
programme must apply for membership of TEPHINET45, which has over thirty members 
globally including WHO and US CDC.    
IRIDE46 (Inventory of Resources for Infectious Diseases in Europe) was created in 
1997	for	fifteen	EU	member	states	plus	Norway	and	Switzerland.	The	project	resulted	in	a	
computerised database in three languages on CD-ROM, an international workshop, a technical 
report with an overview of the major collected information translated into 11 languages and 
printed in 10,500 copies for distribution across Europe. In the year 2000, the web version was 
created as an updatable European inventory on resources for Infectious Diseases Control, 
expanding the coverage to accession countries. Results from the inventory are part of the EU-
IDA EUPHIN (European Union Public Health Information Network) and HSSCD (Health 
Surveillance System on Communicable Diseases). ECDC plans further active data collection 
to	refine	the	inventory	and	fill	in	gaps.
Strengthening CD Surveillance and Control and EU Accession Partners
Figure 4 illustrates WHO’s recommendations for a planning and management cycle that 
includes	the	production	of	a	national	plan	of	action	every	five	years	and	annual	operational	
plans that coincide with the budgetary cycle of ministries of health. 
Although the guidance was not by published until 2006, the main concepts were already 
well established informally in early 2000’s, and they informed the writing of terms of 
reference for surveillance strengthening projects by ministries in WHO European Region, 
often through the networks created by the Integrated Capacity Development Programme 
for	Laboratory	Specialists	 run	 by	WHO	Lyon	Office47. The third cohort of this two year 
programme commenced in 2004 and included Georgia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic 
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of Bulgaria, the Republic of Moldova, the Republic of Turkey, Romania, the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine. This programme focused on strengthening disease detection and 
response activities in home countries through the elaboration and implementation of a plan 
of	action	and	specially	tailored	field	training	and	support.
Figure 4. Cycle illustrating surveillance systems strengthening activities23
WHO guidance on systematic assessment of CDS&C systems was published in 200148, 
and a standard questionnaire and methodology for district public health laboratory assessment 
is	available	on	request	from	the	WHO	Lyon	Office.	A	combined	team	of	approximately	ten	
international and national experts is assembled for one to two weeks of desk-top study and 
field	work	in	a	number	of	locations	in	the	country.	Several	country	assessments	are	available	
on WHO websites. TAIEX49, EC DG SANCO and EC member state national health protection 
institutes have also collaborated to produce ‘peer reviews’ of the accession country CDS&C 
systems,	although	these	reports	are	confidential.	A	standardised	method	is	also	recommended	
for	achieving	consensus	in	setting	national	priorities,	based	on	a	modified	Delphi	method25. 
This method requires a national steering committee to produce an overall explanation 
and	 specific	 fact	 sheets	 for	 each	 of	 the	 health-related	 events	 for	 prioritisation,	 including	
information on up to eight criteria:1) burden of disease; 2) case fatality rate / severity; 3) 
epidemic potential; 4) potential threat / changing pattern; 5) health gain opportunity; 6) social 
and economic impact; 7) international regulations or programmes; 8) public perception. 
Participants	then	score	each	of	the	criteria	for	each	of	the	health-related	events	against	a	five	
point	ranking	scale	of	importance.	Where	possible,	scale	points	are	given	defined	meanings	
in	the	overall	explanation	e.g.	for	burden	of	disease:	1	is	defined	as	incidence	<	1/100,000	
per	 year;	 2	 is	 defined	 as	 incidence	 2	 to	 10	 /100,000	 per	 year,	 etc.	Where	 clear	 priorities	
emerge with a strong consensus, they can be accepted, but where there is a large distribution 
of scores, a second round of prioritisation may be necessary. Individual’s scores are fed back 
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to them according to their position in the whole distribution of scores, which often prompts 
them to revise their judgements toward the median. 
In addition to the actions of national governments, professional bodies, NGOs and 
others to strengthen CDS&C, many externally funded projects have been dedicated to 
this topic. Strengthening complex human and technological systems involving large scale 
public investment and coordinated action in the private sector, requires a Management and 
Organisational Development (M&OD) approach. Organisational Development (OD)50 is 
understood here to mean a social and behavioural science approach to improving working 
efficiency,	quality	of	outputs	and	the	quality	of	life	of	individuals	at	work.	It	is	the	branch	
of management science best placed to develop structures, relationships and human resource 
establishments that optimally discharge surveillance functions within their political and 
economic settings. It arose simultaneously from the post-WWII ‘socio-clinical’ studies’ 
at London’s Tavistock Institute and the group dynamics ‘training laboratories’ at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and other US institutes. Writings on OD tend to stress 
the importance of the ‘psychological contract’ between the organisation and its employees, 
covering areas such as clarity of mission, team working, openness of communication, job 
security	 and	 career	 pathways.	These	 topics	 are	 difficult	 for	 externally	 funded	 projects	 to	
address directly because of the lack of local knowledge and engagement of international 
consultants, and the location of local consultants in projects ‘outside the system’. A fatal 
but common mistake is to imagine that there was no history before the project began and 
no relevant future after the project is over. M&OD theory suggests that this mistake can be 
avoided by considering the project to be a ‘temporary parallel learning organisation’ of the 
national system. In other words that the project seeks to engage the thinkers and innovators 
of the system in an enabling and empowering project environment, giving them the mental 
space	to	reflect	and	plan.	
A key M&OD methodology is ‘action research’, which consists of 1) a preliminary 
organisational diagnosis 2) data gathering together with working groups of the system 3) 
data feedback to the working groups 4) exploration of the data by the working groups 5) 
action planning by the working groups 6) action taking by the working groups 7) evaluation 
and assessment of the results of actions by the working groups50. The project’s consultants 
act as facilitators and technical resources for action research, which differs conceptually from 
hypothesis-driven	research	in	that	it	is	usually	an	iterative	process	of	defining	and	re-defining	
the research problems, often spiralling into, rather than directly approaching, the solution.
The author was team leader of two substantial EC funded projects on CDS&C 
strengthening51,52 which had very similar terms of reference. The Romanian project was 
preceded by a national conference on public health in the context of EC accession which 
selected communicable disease surveillance as a topic for which EC funding would be 
sought. This stimulated a WHO assessment of the system in order to support the preparation 
of the EC terms of reference. The Romanian project terms of reference were subsequently 
used as a model for the Turkish project terms of reference, both of which were broad 
strategies aimed at achieving both institutional reform and large scale capacity building, in 
implementation periods of only two or three years, respectively. Both projects covered review 
and harmonisation to EC  legislation, guidance and SOPs; human resource development, 
budgetary assessment and strengthening of administrative arrangements; prioritisation of 
health-related events for surveillance; development of a new information technology and 
management system; preparation of a national plan of action; epidemiology training at 
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basic and post-basic levels (including an EPIET-like three week residential course for 30 
people); training in laboratory management, quality assurance and practical public health 
microbiology; training through applied and operational research; study tours to EC member 
state institutions; review of biosafety and biosecurity; improvement of biological specimen 
transportation;	technical	specifications	for	supply	of	laboratory	equipment	and	information	
technology. The main differences in design were that the Turkish project 1) was intended as 
an actual transformation of the entire system rather than a pilot implementation, 2) included 
an assessment of the surveillance and public health laboratory systems, 3) did not include 
construction work, whereas the Romanian project contained redesign of the national reference 
laboratory (NRL), 4) included formal training of the trainers in adult education techniques 
for the delivery of epidemiology and laboratory training cascades down to front-line level, 5) 
upgraded the biological safety level III capacity of the NTL.
Figure 5 illustrates the increasing levels of sophistication of evidence relevant to decision 
making in CD strengthening projects. By putting epidemiological research evidence in the 
outer ring, the diagram is intended to show that the overall territory of CDS&C should be 
informed by good quality epidemiological studies – those which address the occurrence 
and determinants of health-related events through hypothesis driven research with adequate 
statistical power to conclude, and with freedom from serious bias. 
Figure 5. Disciplines relevant to strengthening CD surveillance and control
Epidemiology provides the highest level of relevant evidence, and the basic science of all 
public	activity,	however	epidemiological	research	generally	requires	very	specific	expertise,	
512
Health Promotion And Disease Prevention
considerable	 financial	 resources	 and	 ethical	 approval.	 In	 developing	 country	 settings,	 it	
is not generally feasible without external support, and the results of critical appraisal of 
foreign epidemiological literature should be applied with caution after considering the local 
context. 
Below,	and	within	the	domain	of	epidemiologically	justified	designs,	lies	evidence	derived	
from M&OD. There are many differing institutional models of CDS&C in Europe, and to the 
best of the author’s knowledge there are no comparative studies that are methodologically 
adequate to differentiate the effects of structural design from context. CDS&C tends to evolve 
from national historically determined health care services, environmental and veterinary 
practice,	vital	statistics	etc.,	which	in	turn	reflect	specific	social	and	cultural	values	related	
to health. Generally applicable M&OD theories related to human resource development 
and	finance,	performance	management	and	change	management	are	therefore	most	relevant	
conceptual	basis	for	development;	and	accurate	data	concerning	actual	structures,	staffing,	
capital assets and activities are essential. 
By operational research (OR), what is meant is ‘an investigation carried out, by 
scientific	method,	on	actual	operations,	current,	recent,	or	impending,	at	the	request	of	those	
responsible for the initiation or conduct of the operations, and explicitly directed to the better, 
more effective and more economical conduct of similar operations in the future’53. It has its 
own learned societies and journals54, and is often divided into ‘hard’ techniques involving 
mathematical modelling and ‘soft’ techniques based on social sciences55. OR tackles ‘messy 
and complex’ problems, often entailing considerable uncertainty, to examine assumptions, 
facilitate an in-depth understanding and to decide on practical action. It is included in 
EPIET’s description of suitable training activities for fellows43, may not require ethical 
approval if it only requires consideration of routine data56, and its typical applications in 
surveillance include: assessment of factors affecting timeliness; completeness and accuracy 
of data; relative performance of diagnostic tests; outbreak ‘signal detection’ in novel data 
sets e.g. ambulance dispatch data; developing decision making algorithms; and logistical 
studies concerning the organisation of laboratory networks and rapid response teams. In 
terms of the management dictum concerning quality ‘Do the right thing, and do the thing 
right’, OR represents an appropriate way of determining the right technical approach to a 
given problem; whereas M&OD, especially action research, points the way to the best way 
of implementing it. 
The WHO guidance24 defines	monitoring	and	evaluation	as	follows:
‘Monitoring of surveillance systems is the ongoing tracking and analysis of routine 
measurements aimed at detecting changes in the surveillance system. Evaluation is a 
process that attempts to determine as systematically and objectively as possible, the 
relevance, effectiveness, and impact of activities in light of the objectives. Several 
evaluations can be distinguished, e.g. evaluation of structure, process, output, outcome 
and impact. Impact is the extent to which the overall goal of the surveillance and response 
systems is being achieved, e.g. reduction in the case-fatality rate of epidemic-prone 
diseases, changes in the morbidity pattern of targeted communicable diseases or changes 
in behaviours of health staff and of the general population’24. 
The guidance contains 95 suggested indicators covering the four domains of Figure 1 to 
aid the monitoring of progress towards established targets. The list is intended to be adapted 
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to country settings and, if necessary, additional indicators to monitor implementation of the 
national	plans	of	action	should	be	identified.	Indicators	should	be	pre-tested	for	usefulness,	
clarity, availability of denominator and numerator data, ease of collection and calculation 
of measurements. The planning and development activity alone that is required to introduce 
and test such a broad range of new indicators is a considerable task. Furthermore, over half 
of the indicators relate to infrastructure and training that would require a major investment 
programme in order for the ‘poorly maintained’ and ‘virtually collapsed’ systems to catch 
up with the EU average. Where an investment programme is contemplated, restructuring of 
the	surveillance	system	should	move	away	from	the	vertical	systems	of	formal	notification	
to integrated systems which build capacity for surveillance at lower levels, close to where 
control activities take place. Figures 6 and 7 are intended to illustrate the necessary integration 
of systems.  
Figures 6 and 7: Restructuring Surveillance Systems:
Fig 6. Vertical	Notification	System       Fig 7.  Horizontally Integrated Intelligence   
          System  
All national CDS&C systems need to be hierarchically organised in order to operate the 
clear lines of command necessary to respond to a national emergency and to cover the entire 
territory	with	qualified	field	epidemiological	input.	However,	the	pyramid	needs	to	be	broad	
enough	so	that	intelligence	can	flow	through	personal	networks	operating	at	all	levels.	A	major	
goal of training activities should be to establish these networks though through case studies 
and simulation exercises. Routine management cycles between levels, i.e. reporting of data 
to the level above and feedback of interpreted action-reports to the level below, make data 
consistency checking, validation and quality assurance feasible. It is not practically possible 
for staff in distant ministries of health to change the data collecting behaviour of individual 
laboratories and clinicians. Providing sub-national staff are well trained, experienced and 
committed to quality, their local knowledge can be harnessed to develop a national health 
intelligence system that may not require great investments in information technology. The 
software component of a national electronic surveillance system was established in Germany 
for	just	€170,000	initial	development	cost	plus	€150,000	per	year	for	maintenance	and	ongoing	
improvement57. Another crucial issue that Figure 7 is supposed to illustrate, however, is that a 
broadening of the base of the pyramid requires also a broadening of the mid-sections and the 
top. Staff with the ability and training to run epidemiological intelligence systems cannot be 
created overnight. Again, Germany provides a cost-effective model for training high quality 
professionals through a national FETP58  
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Prospects and problems in CDS&C
The greatest problem for the weaker CDS&C systems in WHO’s European Region is 
the scale of investments and activities required to meet the legally required international 
standards. Despite the potentially disastrous consequences of mishandling a major epidemic, 
in terms of human suffering, damage to trade and political repercussions, both the absolute 
and relative amounts of domestic funding directed to public health systems are far too low. 
Donor funded projects can act as a catalyst for change, and can provide targeted investments, 
but medium to long term national capital development programmes are required to 
institutionalise change and to create sustainable development. In countries where the public 
health laboratory infrastructure has been allowed to deteriorate, the costs of re-establishing a 
modern dedicated network can be high. Where there are good quality laboratories in state and 
university hospitals, it is tempting to utilise some of this capacity by contractual agreement 
with the ministry of health. There are few national examples, however, where ministries 
of health have been prepared to rely solely on the capacity of clinical laboratories. A good 
compromise may be to maintain a national reference laboratory for policy development, 
training, specialised testing, quality assurance and consultancy, with a small sub-national 
network of public health laboratories that each coordinate the public health activities of 
hospital	/	university	clinical	laboratories	in	their	region,	and	provide	confirmatory	testing.	
Perhaps the second greatest problem for weaker CDS&C systems relates to the organisation 
of	 trained	medical	 and	 technical	 labour.	Where	 real	 salaries	 and	benefits	 are	much	 lower	
in public health than clinical practice, and where the private sector offers more attractive 
remuneration, recruiting, training and retaining professional staff can be problematic. Like the 
need for capital investment referred to above, the only solution to this problem is a properly 
resourced policy commitment. The scope for development within existing institutions is 
often very limited because overall health sector strategies and restructuring plans prohibit 
the creation of new posts or departments, and public sector employment law may establish 
mandatory pay norms and protect staff positions, even though they are no longer required. 
Primary legislation may be necessary to create new institutions and, in any case, there is 
often	more	scope	for	developing	non-financial	incentives,	including:	high	levels	of	training	
professional, academic interest and professional recognition; a well described progressive 
career pathway; joint academic posts; and opportunities for international representation. 
Overall, however, the prospects look good for strengthening of CDS&C in Europe. 
Greater awareness of the potentially disastrous consequences of emerging and re-emerging 
diseases and bio-terrorism has resulted in a steep increase in the availability of international 
development funding. ECDC, and the ongoing development programmes that it has inherited, 
look set to improve the standardisation of national systems across the EU, which will also 
positively	influence	its	neighbours.	Technical	advances	are	rapidly	making	CDS&C	not	only	
more effective, but also more professionally interesting. Automation of data collection and 
processing frees professional staff to interrogate databases and to interpret information rather 
than simply preparing tables of data. Improvements in nucleic acid test diagnosis and genetic 
typing of micro organisms are bringing CD epidemiology closer to its basis in population 
biology, and with the aid of insights from mathematical modelling, it is becoming possible to 
ground	policy	on	a	more	scientific	evidence	base.							
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